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Abstract
In middle-income countries, the informal sector often accounts for a substantial fraction
of urban employment. We develop a general equilibrium model with matching frictions
in the urban labour market, the possibility of self-employment in the informal sector, and
scope for rural-urban migration. We investigate the eﬀects of diﬀerent types of growth
on wages and the informal sector, and the extent to which labour market institutions can
inﬂuence aggregate productivity. We quantify these eﬀects by calibrating the model to data
for Mexico, a country with a sizeable informal sector and signiﬁcant labour market rigidities.
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This paper is addressed at a critical question for development economists: how do growth and
labour markets interact in poorer countries? At present, we know relatively little about how
diﬀerent types of growth translate into labour market outcomes. We know even less about the
eﬀects of labour market institutions on aggregate productivity and sectoral structure. In this
paper, we introduce a small-scale general equilibrium model that can be used to address these
questions.
The model features an urban manufacturing sector, an urban informal sector, and rural
agriculture. Underemployment arises because of matching frictions in the formal sector labour
market. In equilibrium, workers not employed in the formal sector can choose between self-
employment in the informal sector, and working in the agricultural sector. The model is suf-
ﬁciently rich to incorporate not only diﬀerent types of growth, but also important real-world
aspects of developing country labour markets, including continual mobility between sectors,
employment protection, recruitment costs, and ineﬃciency in the worker-job matching process
and the overall allocation of labour.
We calibrate the model to data for Mexico, a middle-income country often thought to
be characterized by ineﬃcient labour markets. Mexico’s informal sector is often estimated
to represent at least 30% of the urban workforce. We show that this is consistent with the
equilibrium of the calibrated model under plausible assumptions about structural parameters.
We then use the calibrated model to quantify the eﬀects of diﬀerent types of productivity growth
on wages, underemployment, sectoral structure, urbanization and national income. Unusually,
we also consider eﬀects in the other direction, from labour markets to growth: how do labour
market institutions inﬂuence sectoral structure, labour income and aggregate productivity?
Our paper is motivated by the observation that, in many developing countries, a signiﬁcant
fraction of the urban workforce is engaged in low-wage, low-productivity occupations - the
“informal sector” identiﬁed by Hart (1973) and the 1972 ILO Employment Mission to Kenya
(ILO, 1972). The relevant activities are those for which capital requirements and entry barriers
are low, so that self-employment provides an alternative to more conventional employment.
The existence of a large informal sector suggests that labour is under-utilized, with implications
for aggregate productivity, poverty and inequality. It also raises the possibility that workers
in the informal sector will be left behind by economic growth and policy initiatives, which
primarily beneﬁt those in the salaried formal sector. With this in mind, the descriptive literature
on development policy often calls for “labour-intensive” growth, to draw workers out of the
informal sector. Yet too many discussions can seem atheoretical, failing to acknowledge the
interdependence of sectors, or to clarify the origins of underemployment.
If we are to address these questions, a general equilibrium analysis is essential.1 Our multi-
1This point has been understood for many years. The potential importance of the informal sector, and the
more general “employment problem” in developing countries, was established by a series of ILO country reports
1sector model retains several features of the classic analysis due to Harris and Todaro (1970), but
allows urban wages to be endogenously determined, along with sectoral structure and the size
of the informal sector. As we will see, some predictions of the model are qualitatively similar to
those of the Harris-Todaro model, but overall the new model has a richer structure and wider
implications.
In the model, the urban informal sector and the rural sector are closely integrated. Workers
can move between these sectors, and employment in either is instantly available. In contrast,
it takes workers time to ﬁnd jobs in the urban formal sector: the process by which workers are
matched with formal sector ﬁrms is imperfect, without any kind of Walrasian auctioneer. This
assumption naturally gives rise to a two-tier labour market in the urban sector. Underemploy-
ment arises not from an exogenously imposed wage rigidity, but from matching frictions in the
urban labour market. This approach seems especially appealing for middle-income countries.
Matching frictions and search theory have been successfully applied to the study of developed
country labour markets, and there are no obvious reasons why urban labour markets in middle-
income countries would have less substantial frictions.2
Given our emphasis on matching frictions, a natural starting point is the Mortensen-Pissarides
model established in a series of papers, notably Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), and also set
out in Pissarides (2000). We embed their approach to matching frictions within a speciﬁcf a c -
tors model with three factors and two commodities: one commodity produced by the urban
sector using labour and capital, and the other by rural agriculture using labour and land. In
a variant of the basic model, we open the urban sector to international ﬂows of capital, so
that the capital stock in this sector is endogenously determined. We also consider two diﬀerent
assumptions about formal sector wage determination. For all versions of the model, we show
that the equilibrium is unique and saddle-path stable, and examine the associated comparative
statics. We also carry out an eﬃciency analysis, comparing the decentralized equilibrium with
the social planning solution.
As this brief description makes clear, our main contribution is to use matching frictions to
explain the importance of the informal sector in developing countries. At ﬁr s ts i g h t ,i tm a ys e e m
unlikely that matching frictions will be suﬃcient, by themselves, to yield a sizeable informal
sector as an equilibrium outcome. Why don’t formal sector ﬁrms create more jobs, and absorb
the underemployed? Why don’t underemployed urban workers choose to relocate to the rural
agricultural sector? With these questions in mind, we explore the quantitative implications of
in the early 1970s. The favourable review of these reports by Thorbecke (1973) drew attention to the need
for a general equilibrium approach in future work, but there are relatively few general equilibrium models for
developing countries that specify urban labour markets in detail, and even fewer that quantify the relevant
eﬀects. We discuss the leading exceptions in section 2 below. An alternative approach to growth and inequality
emphasizes the role of ﬁnancial deepening, as in the work on Thailand of Jeong (2005) and Jeong and Townsend
(2003).
2Pissarides (2000), Rogerson et al. (2005) and Yashiv (2005) provide recent surveys of search and matching
models applied to developed country labour markets.
2the matching model in detail, and show that a sizeable informal sector can be an equilibrium
outcome under plausible assumptions.
Another attractive feature of the matching model is that workers are continually moving
between the informal sector and higher-paid jobs in the formal sector. This is consistent with the
high degree of labour market mobility identiﬁed by recent empirical studies, notably Maloney
(1999, 2002), Gong and van Soest (2002) and Gong et al. (2004), using longitudinal data for
Mexico. Their work has emphasized the degree of integration between diﬀerent labour markets,
in contrast to an older view that the formal and informal sectors are rigidly segmented. The
extent of mobility between diﬀerent labour market states appears high even relative to richer
countries (Maloney 2002, Gong et al. 2004).
This helps to motivate our emphasis on matching frictions, since one strength of the matching
approach is an explicit model for transitions between labour market states. Another strength,
relative to other possible models of developing country labour markets, is that many of the
relevant parameters and outcomes can be measured in the data. We use microeconometric
studies to pin down structural parameters in our calibration exercise, and to obtain estimates
of the formal sector wage premium that control for worker characteristics.
We should note some of the limitations of our analysis at the outset. The emphasis on
matching frictions, and the stylized way we model the agricultural sector, suggest that our model
is most relevant to middle-income countries. In poorer countries, with substantial poverty in
rural areas, the eﬀects of growth are likely to depend on the organization and institutions of
agriculture.3 The theoretical and quantitative analysis in this paper does not address these
issues. Our modelling choices are more appropriate to middle-income countries, where the rural
sector typically accounts for a much lower share of total employment, and where urban labour
market frictions are perhaps more likely to resemble those in developed countries.
The modelling of the informal sector is also stylized. In the model, informal sector activity
is characterized as a form of self-employment, requiring no capital, while ﬁrms in the formal
sector use capital and must comply with employment protection legislation (ﬁring costs and
severance payments). These assumptions have most in common with the “dualist” view that
informal sector activities are marginal, characterized by free entry and incomes that are essen-
tially unrelated to the formal sector.4 Also as in the dualist view, these activities provide an
unoﬃcial safety net in the absence of state-provided unemployment insurance. But the model
also characterizes the informal sector as inherently more dynamic than in many dualist accounts.
The sector can contribute a substantial share of GDP, and as emphasized above, workers are
continually moving between the two tiers of the urban labour market.
3The importance of these considerations has been made clear by, for example, empirical research on the eﬀects
of technical progress in agriculture (especially the Green Revolution) on rural poverty in India. Basu and Mallick
(2005) discuss some of the relevant considerations.
4This also means that we are locating the origins of the informal sector in the workings of the urban labour
market, rather than in business taxes and regulations. de Soto (1989) and Loayza (1996) emphasize the role of
the latter.
3The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses some of the related
literature and the background to this paper. Section 3 describes the model, while section 4
characterizes its steady-state. Section 5 considers the comparative statics. In sections 6 and
7w eﬁrst describe the assumptions of the calibration exercise, and then study the calibrated
model’s responses to changes in structural parameters; it is important to emphasize that we
regard this quantitative investigation as a central contribution of the paper. Finally, section 8
concludes.
2B a c k g r o u n d
A prime motivation for this paper is the lack of research on the interactions between growth and
labour markets. Although the main source of income for the poor is labour income, the best-
known growth models can rarely accommodate diﬀerent types of growth, and have little to say
on how growth translates into labour income for the poor. For the most part, growth economics
and labour economics have proceeded independently of one another. As a result, the eﬀects of
growth on labour markets are rarely studied, and the origins of “high-quality” or “pro-poor”
growth remain more talked about than understood (Agénor 2005a). Meanwhile, although many
developing countries seem to be characterized by ineﬃcient labour market outcomes, we know
relatively little about their causes and eﬀects.
In seeking to address these questions, the current paper is related to a number of previous
contributions, which we describe in this section. The model we put forward is squarely in the
long-standing dual economy tradition, in which an urban, non-agricultural sector coexists with
a sizeable agricultural sector.5 These models can often be seen as speciﬁcd e p a r t u r e sf r o mt h e
standard 2 x 2 or 3 x 2 general equilibrium models of production used in trade theory. As
noted in the introduction, our model has the same basic structure as the 3 x 2 model with three
factors and two commodities.
One of the most inﬂuential dual economy models is that of Harris and Todaro (1970),
and there is a sense in which our paper is a response to that classic analysis. It is therefore
useful to describe the 2 x 2 version of the Harris-Todaro model introduced by Corden and
Findlay (1975). Consider a small open economy with two sectors, in which both goods can be
traded internationally at world prices. One sector is urban non-agriculture, and the other rural
agriculture. There are two factors, capital and labour, each in ﬁxed supply. There are constant
returns to scale and perfect competition in each sector, and factors receive their marginal
products. Perfect intersectoral capital mobility means that the returns to capital are equalized
between the two sectors.
If labour is also perfectly mobile between sectors and wages in each sector are ﬂexible, we
then have the textbook 2 x 2 trade theory model. Instead, the Harris-Todaro model assumes
5For surveys of the dual economy literature see Kanbur and McIntosh (1988) and Temple (2005).
4that the urban wage is exogenously ﬁxed above the market-clearing level. This generates urban
unemployment. If workers are risk neutral, and jobs in the urban sector are allocated by a
lottery, the long-run migration equilibrium occurs when expected incomes in the two sectors are
equal. Formally, the equilibrium condition is uz +(1−u)¯ wm = wa where u is the (endogenous)
urban unemployment rate, z ≥ 0 is unemployment income, ¯ wm is the ﬁxed urban wage and wa
the market-clearing rural wage.
The Harris-Todaro version of the 2 x 2 model has some interesting properties. It can explain
why rural-urban migration persists even in the face of high urban unemployment: workers are
willing to bear the risk of urban unemployment, because locating in the city brings with it the
possibility of higher wages. Combined with migration, this leads to powerful and sometimes
counter-intuitive general equilibrium eﬀects. For example, a productivity improvement in the
urban sector can generate extra rural-urban migration and therefore increase the number of un-
employed. This is the “Todaro paradox”, where urban employment creation is not accompanied
by any decline in urban unemployment.
T h ee l e g a n c eo ft h eH a r r i s - T o d a r om o d e lc o m e sa tap r i c e .T h ea s s u m p t i o nt h a tt h eu r b a n
wage is exogenously ﬁxed above the market-clearing level is unattractive, especially if we want
to study the long-run consequences of productivity growth. It is also intellectually unsatisfying.
Given that underemployment seems pervasive in the developing world, appealing to an institu-
tionally determined urban wage is disconcertingly simplistic. Although powerful trade unions
or minimum wage legislation may play a role in some poorer countries, this is unlikely to be the
case everywhere, and a more general explanation seems desirable.6
These points are not new, and papers by Agénor (2004, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c), Bencivenga
and Smith (1997), Brueckner and Zenou (1999), Calvo (1978), Krebs and Maloney (1999), Laing
et al. (2004), MacLeod and Malcomson (1998), Moene (1988) and Stiglitz (1974, 1976, 1982)
all develop models in which the urban wage is endogenously determined. Relative to many
of these papers, our analysis is distinctive in its investigation of the quantitative implications
of the model, and in oﬀe r i n gau n i ﬁed approach to the analysis of labour market outcomes in
developed and developing countries; the developing country case is distinguished mainly by the
possibility of rural-urban migration.
We brieﬂy discuss some of these previous contributions. In the Moene (1988) eﬃciency-
wage reformulation of the Harris-Todaro model, the equilibrium urban wage must be above the
market-clearing level in order to deter shirking, and this gives rise to equilibrium unemploy-
ment. As in our work, a key element of Moene’s analysis is a migration equilibrium condition
that equates the present value of urban unemployment to the present value of rural wages.
Moene’s paper derives some simple comparative static results, but does not explore the model’s
quantitative properties. We will use a similar eﬃciency wage analysis as one of the mechanisms
6For our main focus, Mexico, minimum wages appear to have been too low to be a binding constraint on the
formal sector (Bell 1997). This suggests the reasons for Mexico’s large informal sector must be sought elsewhere.
5for dividing the match surplus that arises in our model.
In the more detailed analysis of Bencivenga and Smith (1997), unemployment arises because
of the presence of two types of workers who diﬀer in their productivity, leading to an adverse se-
lection problem in the urban labour market (see also Eicher 1999). Bencivenga and Smith study
the eﬀect of capital accumulation within this model, ﬁnding similar eﬀects to those in Harris-
Todaro: for example, capital accumulation can raise urban unemployment. They emphasize the
associated dynamics, and the possibility of multiple equilibria.
MacLeod and Malcomson (1997) analyse a two-sector model in which workers can be moti-
v a t e db ye i t h e re ﬃciency wages or bonus schemes (performance pay). One sector is relatively
labour-intensive, and can be interpreted as a rural agricultural sector. In equilibrium, the two
sectors may use diﬀerent reward schemes, and this generates a rural-urban wage diﬀerential.
They simulate the response of this economy to a fall in the cost of creating urban sector jobs,
and examine the implications for unemployment, total output, wages in the two sectors, and the
Gini coeﬃcient. Their model is especially innovative in allowing equilibrium reward schemes to
arise endogenously, but their simulations consider fewer experiments, and proceed under simpler
assumptions, than those we discuss below.
In purely theoretical terms, the papers closest to ours are Laing et al. (2004) and Zenou
(2005). As in our work, these authors consider an urban labour market with matching frictions
in the context of a dual economy.7 The Laing et al. (2004) model is primarily designed to apply
to China, and assumes that a fraction of the workforce are legally required to work in rural areas
(a form of migration restriction) but may seek urban work illegally. This makes some aspects of
the model more complex than ours, but they simplify the analysis by assuming that the average
product of labour is ﬁxed in each sector. In our model, these average products are endogenously
determined. A more important diﬀerence between the papers is that we explore eﬃciency and
the quantitative implications of matching frictions, whereas Laing et al. and Zenou focus on
comparative statics, and do not explore the ability of their models to match the data.
Our paper is also related to previous work that embeds search frictions in trade models, as in
Davidson et al. (1999) and Waelde and Weiss (2005). These papers concentrate on theoretical
results, and especially the extent to which standard trade-theoretic results generalize in the
presence of search frictions. Again, they do not consider quantitative implications in detail.
Their analyses give less emphasis to the rural-urban distinction, and explicit applications to
developing countries, than either our paper or Laing et al. (2004).
When matching models are applied to developing countries, as in Laing et al. (2004), Zenou
(2005) and this paper, there will typically be a formal connection with models of developed
country labour markets that consider endogenous participation in the labour force. These papers
include Garibaldi and Wasmer (2005) and Haefke and Reiter (2005). In our model, workers who
7See also Krebs and Maloney (1999), who brieﬂy discuss how their turnover cost model could integrate
matching considerations.
6choose rural employment behave rather like workers who choose not to participate, at least if the
returns to nonparticipation are heterogeneous across individuals (corresponding to variation in
rural wages as workers move in and out of the rural sector). Our assumptions on the agricultural
technology, by pinning down the response of nonparticipation returns to variation in the size of
the rural sector, determine the speciﬁc pattern of this heterogeneity. We can also reinterpret
any ﬁxed cost associated with moving between participation and nonparticipation as a rural-
urban migration cost. The remaining departures in our analysis, beyond the developing country
interpretation, are that we allow the urban capital stock to be endogenous, and consider two
theories of urban wage determination.
Looking further aﬁeld, our work is related to computable general equilibrium models with
relatively detailed labour market structures, including Devarajan, Ghanem and Thierfelder
(1997, 1999), Maechler and Roland-Holst (1997) and Thierfelder and Shiells (1997). These
papers often focus on trade policy issues, rather than seeing the interaction between growth
and labour markets as interesting in its own right. Our analysis is also related to calibrations
of search and matching models for developed countries, notably Andolfatto (1996), Cole and
Rogerson (1999), Den Haan, Haefke and Ramey (2005), Den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000),
Garibaldi and Wasmer (2005), Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004) and Merz (1995). Our calibration
draws on some of their assumptions, especially those of Andolfatto (1996), but we do not study
the dynamics of adjustment or the propagation of shocks. Instead, we are chieﬂy interested
in whether the steady-state of the model is consistent with a sizeable informal sector, and in
the response of equilibrium outcomes to diﬀerent types of growth. Another key diﬀerence from
previous research is that we quantify the eﬀect of various labour market parameters, such as the
eﬃciency of the matching process, on sectoral structure and aggregate productivity, questions
that are rarely addressed elsewhere.
3 The model
As noted in the previous section, our analysis uses a speciﬁc factors (3 x 2) model of a small
open economy with two sectors, urban and rural, that has been extended to include a more
detailed speciﬁcation of the urban labour market. The outputs of the urban formal sector and
the rural agricultural sector can each be traded on world markets at an exogenous relative price.
We treat agricultural output as the numeraire, and choose units for urban output such that its
price can also be normalized to one. When we analyze the eﬀects of ‘growth’, we will achieve
this by considering a large shock to the level of TFP in either the rural or urban sector.8
8One possible response is that our model can say little about the eﬀects of growth, because it does not consider
a model with a balanced growth path. We think this objection is misplaced. Some important forms of growth
- an obvious example would be the Green Revolution in agricultural technologies - will be best studied using
step-changes in the level of TFP parameters. See also Solow (2000, p. 100), who argues that the conventional
emphasis on steady-state growth is misplaced, and risks falling into a semantic trap.
7As is common in the dual economy literature, we model the rural (agricultural) sector as
perfectly competitive, and characterized by constant returns to scale and full employment. The
structure of the urban sector is more complicated. Urban workers are either employed by a ﬁrm
in the formal sector, or self-employed in the informal sector. While working in the informal
sector, workers can also look for higher-paid jobs in the formal sector, with a variable degree of
search eﬀort. Workers and job vacancies are matched as in the standard Mortensen-Pissarides
model, incorporating a role for capital in the formal sector.
Once matched, the surplus that arises is divided according to either Nash bargaining or
eﬃciency wage considerations. As well as two diﬀerent wage setting assumptions, we have two
possible assumptions about the capital account. When the capital account is closed, the urban
capital stock is treated as exogenously ﬁxed. When the capital account is open, the marginal
product of formal sector capital must equal the world real interest rate in equilibrium, and
hence the urban capital stock is endogenously determined. The two possible assumptions for
both wage setting and capital mobility mean that, throughout the paper, we consider four
diﬀerent versions of the model.
3.1 Notation and model structure
The economy is populated by a continuum of identical workers of measure one. Let the two
sectors be indexed by i with i = a denoting agriculture and i = m denoting the urban (manu-
facturing) sector, and let Li,K i and ki be the mass of workers, the capital stock and the capital
stock per employed worker in sector i respectively. The capital stocks are sector-speciﬁc, and
so agricultural “capital” can be interpreted as land.
Informal sector workers account for a proportion u of the urban labour force; for simplic-
ity, we call this the urban unemployment rate, and often use the term “unemployment” as a
convenient shorthand for the informal sector.9 Note that La + Lm =1 ,w h i l ef o r m a ls e c t o r
employment is given by (1−u)Lm. The capital-labour ratios in the two sectors are ka = Ka/La
and km = Km/((1 − u)Lm) respectively.
All workers are risk neutral. In agriculture, each worker produces g(ka) where g(ka) is the
agricultural production function in intensive form. The worker is paid a wage wa and obtains a
utility stream wa +xa where xa > 0 indicates a preference for living outside the city. Since the
agricultural sector is perfectly competitive we can write








where g0(ka)=ra is the rental cost of the ﬁxed factor in agriculture. The semi-colon in the
9This usage is less casual than it may seem. It relates to “productivity deﬁnitions” of unemployment in
which workers are classed as unemployed when below a threshold level of productivity. This is sometimes a more
relevant deﬁnition of unemployment for developing countries. The absence of unemployment insurance means
that open unemployment is rare and mainly conﬁned to the educated and well-oﬀ.
8r.h.s. of (1) separates endogenous variables from exogenous variables, and we use this notation
throughout the paper.
The urban labour market is modelled along similar lines to Pissarides (2000). Relative to
the simplest models he describes, the main complications are that we allow workers to choose
to locate in either urban areas or agriculture, include ﬁring costs in the urban formal sector,
and that we allow endogenous search intensity on the part of informal sector workers. The
motivation for including search intensity is to model discouraged worker eﬀects: as the informal
sector becomes large, and job-ﬁnding probabilities low, workers may devote relatively little time
to active search.
Production in the formal sector is undertaken by one-worker ﬁrms. To enter production,
a new formal sector ﬁrm must post a vacancy. This involves a ﬂow cost c for the duration
the vacancy is open. It is important to note that we interpret the act of entry and posting
a “vacancy” more broadly than usual. In the developing country context, it may not involve
a formal advertisement or use of a labour exchange, but instead the engagement of time and
resources in alternative ways of recruiting workers. These could include the use of senior workers
or employment brokers to identify employees through social networks, a possibility noted in
Collier (1975) and Mazumdar (1983).
Open vacancies are ﬁlled at an (endogenous) Poisson rate q. Once a vacancy has been ﬁlled,
the ﬁrm agrees a wage wm with the worker and hires capital km.T h eﬁrm’s output is given by
Amf(km) where Am is a TFP parameter and f(km) is a standard constant returns production
function in intensive form. The process of formal sector wage determination will be discussed
later.
The ﬁrm-employee match continues until its productivity is destroyed by a ﬁrm-speciﬁc
shock, which means that production is no longer proﬁtable. Job destruction occurs at an
exogenous Poisson rate λ. At this point the ﬁrm’s capital is released for rental by other ﬁrms,
and the worker moves into the informal sector. The ﬁrm incurs a ﬁring cost F and must also
make a severance payment P to the departing employee. We include these costs in the model
because of their importance for the Mexican labour market, the focus of our calibration exercise
in sections 6 and 7 below.
As is standard, our assumptions lead to Bellman equations that deﬁne the present value of
each possible state. We consider workers ﬁrst, and then ﬁrms. For workers, the present value of
working in the informal sector is U, while formal sector employment is associated with a present
value of W. The discount rate is denoted by r. We make the standard assumption that workers
who migrate from agriculture ﬁrst enter the informal sector. For now, we will also assume
that the city is initially small, so that migration ﬂows from agriculture to the city, denoted
f, are positive. Migration in either direction involves a cost B + b|f|, where the parameter b
represents a congestion eﬀect in the level of migration. The migration equilibrium condition is
9that agricultural workers are indiﬀerent between staying in agriculture and migrating:10
wa + xa + r(B + bf)=rU (2)
In the formal sector, each worker receives a utility stream equal to her wage wm. In the
informal sector, each worker receives a utility stream given by z−σ(s;z,Π). Here z represents a
ﬁxed level of output associated with full-time self-employment, while σ is the cost associated with
searching for a formal sector job (perhaps foregone output) and Π indexes exogenous inﬂuences
on search costs. These search costs σ(s;z,Π) and the marginal costs of search σs(s;z,Π) are
a s s u m e dt ob ei n c r e a s i n gi ns, z and the shift parameter Π. There are no entry costs associated
with the informal sector, which is consistent with empirical evidence for Mexico in McKenzie
and Woodruﬀ (2004).
We consider a symmetric equilibrium where all unemployed workers search at the same
intensity s for a formal job, and face the same probability ¯ q of being matched with a vacancy.
The Bellman equations for workers are then:
rU = z − σ +¯ q(W − U)+ ˙ U (3)
rW = wm + λ(U − W + P)+ ˙ W (4)
For ﬁrms, we denote the present value of a vacancy by V and the present value of a ﬁlled
job by J.W eu s ev to denote the vacancy rate, which is the ratio of vacancies to the mass of
individuals in the urban sector. The Bellman equations for ﬁrms are
rV = −c + qJ + ˙ V (5)
rJ = y(km) − wm − λ(J + F + P)+ ˙ J (6)
where y(km)=Amf(km) − Amf0(km)km is the ﬁrm’s output net of capital costs (or the
marginal product of labour).
Given that we assume free, instantaneous entry into the creation of vacancies, the zero-proﬁt
condition
V =0 (7)
is assumed to hold continuously.
The matching rates q (for a ﬁrm ﬁlling a vacancy) and ¯ q (for a worker ﬁnding formal sector
10When migration costs B are strictly positive, there are multiple equilibria. An equilibrium in which no
further migration will take place is given by wa + xa + χrB = rU where in general χ c a nt a k ea n yv a l u ei nt h e
interval [−1,1]. For example if agriculture is initially small and workers migrate from the city to agriculture,
then migration will cease when wa + xa − rB = rU, so χ = −1. This does not aﬀect the baseline calibration,
w h e r ew ee ﬀectively infer a value for xa + χrB, but does aﬀect the comparative statics results and is discussed
further where appropriate. Unless otherwise stated, we will either proceed with the assumption that B =0or
describe the equilibrium with χ =1 .
10employment) are endogenous. Our treatment of the matching process is again standard. The
number of matches at each instant depends on the search eﬀorts of the informal sector workers,
and the number of open vacancies. We write the number of matches as an increasing function
m(suLm,vL m;M) of total search eﬀort by the unemployed. The ﬁrst argument is the number
of unemployed uLm multiplied by their average search intensity s, and the second argument
the number of open vacancies vLm. Finally an exogenous shift parameter M is used to index
the eﬃciency of the matching process. In line with empirical work for developed countries, the
function m(.) is assumed to have constant returns to scale.11















where the second equality follows from constant returns, and we deﬁne τ ≡ v/suas a measure
of labour market “tightness”. Note that q(τ;M) and τq(τ;M)=m(1,τ;M) are respectively
decreasing and increasing in τ, a n db o t hi n c r e a s i n gi nm a t c h i n ge ﬃciency M.
We now examine the decision problem of informal sector workers, who must decide how
actively to search for a formal sector job. Diﬀerent workers will face diﬀerent probabilities
of being matched with a vacancy, if they search with diﬀerent levels of intensity. Suppose
an informal sector worker indexed by i w i t hap r e s e n tv a l u eo ff u t u r ee a r n i n g sUi searches
at intensity si while all others search at intensity s. Her matching rate ¯ qi is assumed to be





If we equate this worker’s marginal search costs (σsi) and expected beneﬁts (
d¯ qi
dsi(W − Ui))
from search, and then impose Ui = U and si = s to obtain symmetry, we get the ﬁrst-order
condition for search intensity:
σs(s;z,Π)=τq(W − U) (8)
We also have ¯ q = sτq and so from (3):











11In our calibration we use the standard Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation m(su,v)=M(su)
ηv
1−η. The assumption
of constant returns is consistent with empirical evidence (Petrongolo and Pissarides 2001) and Cobb-Douglas can
elegantly be justiﬁed by the theoretical microfoundations given in Stevens (2002).
11Here φ is the elasticity of search costs with respect to s. Note that, since the marginal cost
of search is increasing in s, the function ζ(
+
s;z,Π) is increasing in s. We will typically assume
that the elasticity φ is a constant which must then be greater than one.
Finally, we note some useful relationships. From (5) and (7) we have a simple condition for










+ W − U
¶
= y(km) − λF − ζ +(˙ J + ˙ W − ˙ U) (11)
To complete the model, we need to specify the determination of the formal sector wage.
As in standard models with matching frictions, a match is associated with rents that must be
divided between workers and ﬁrms, and the formal sector wage determines the allocation of the
surplus. We consider two diﬀerent theories: a Nash bargaining process, and eﬃciency wages.
This will allow us to derive an expression for W − U that holds in and out of steady state.
3.2 Wage bargaining
The most common approach in matching models is to assume that rents are divided according
to a generalized Nash bargaining solution. Using the parameter β ∈ (0,1) to index worker
bargaining power, a wage bargain i in the formal sector leads to a wage wm,i such that
wm,i =a r gm a x ( Wi − U)β (Ji − V )
1−β
which since ∂Wi
∂wm,i = − ∂Ji
∂wm,i yields the following symmetric outcome
(1 − β)(W − U)=β (J − V ) (12)
Here we assume that the relevant disagreement point, and hence the bargained wage, is
independent of ﬁring costs. Implicitly, we are assuming that if workers “walk away” from the
bargaining process, the ﬁrm is not liable to pay a ﬁring cost. Under this assumption we can
allow for ﬁring costs and continuous renegotiation, without the need to distinguish an outside
wage, bargained before employment, from an inside wage bargained after employment has begun
(for a discussion of this distinction see Pissarides, 2000). The need to allow wages to evolve
would make our later calibration unnecessarily complex, and instead we eﬀectively assume that
the outside wage always prevails.
123.3 Eﬃciency wages
An alternative way of dividing the surplus is to appeal to eﬃciency wage considerations. For
simplicity, we consider a simple model where the formal sector wage is used to deter shirking,
as in Moene (1988). If a formal sector worker shirks he obtains a certain gain G at the risk
of being caught and ﬁred with probability π; if detected, shirking is veriﬁable and the worker
receives no severance pay in this case. We assume that ﬁrms will ﬁnd it optimal to set the
wage suﬃciently high to deter shirking. Writing down the Bellman equations for shirking and
non-shirking workers implies that the wage wm will have to ensure
W − U =
G
π
≡ X, say (13)
w h e r ew ea s s u m et h a tw o r k e r sw h oa r ei n d i ﬀerent do not shirk. Rather than treat X as
known, our calibration for the eﬃciency wage case will back out a value for this parameter. From
a theoretical point of view, the key diﬀerence from the Nash bargaining case is that W − U is
ﬁxed rather than endogenous, with implications for how the economy responds to productivity
g r o w t ha n do t h e rp a r a m e t e rc h a n g e s . I nt e r m so fm a t c h i n gt h ed a t aw h e nw et u r nt ot h e
calibration, the eﬃciency wage assumption has another consequence: under this assumption, it
may be easier to justify workers receiving a large share of the match surplus than when wages
are set according to a Nash bargain.
4 Steady state
In the Mortensen-Pissarides model the steady-state is unique and saddle-path stable, under
standard assumptions. Our speciﬁcation of the urban labour market follows that model closely,
and migrants respond to utility diﬀerences between the urban and rural sectors in a way that
should be stabilizing. Hence when the ﬁxed cost of migration is zero (B =0 ) and the equilibrium
is unique, we would expect this model to have similar stability properties. Appendix A shows
that this is the case for all four variants of the model. When B>0 there is a continuum
of equilbria (see footnote 10) and hence perturbations are likely to cause a shift from one
equilibrium to another.
We now characterize some properties of the steady-state. Our conditions for a steady state
are as follows. We set migration ﬂows f =0in the migration condition (2) and impose ˙ U =
˙ W = ˙ V = ˙ J =0in equations (3) to (6). In the open capital account case, we require the
marginal product of capital to be equal to the world interest rate. Finally, we require that in
























+ xa + rB = ζ(
+
s;z,Π) (16)
We now solve all four possible versions of the model: under Nash bargaining or eﬃciency
wages, and a ﬁxed or endogenous urban capital stock (the latter corresponding to an open
capital account). In all cases, the model can be reduced to two equations in two unknowns,
which allows a straightforward analysis of the comparative statics in section 5 below.
4.1 Wage bargaining
















































 = y(km) − λF − ζ(
+
s;z,Π) (19)
The behaviour of km depends on our assumption regarding the capital account. With an
open capital account, the urban capital stock Km a d j u s t su n t i lt h er e t u r no nc a p i t a li nt h e
formal sector is equal to the world real interest rate. Given our assumption of constant returns
to scale, this implies that the formal sector capital-labour ratio km is exogenous. Given (18),
the relations (16) and (19) form a system of two equations in two unknowns, s and Lm.G i v e n
the solutions for search intensity s and “city size” Lm we can then solve the remainder of the
system.
With a closed capital account, Km is assumed exogenous, and the urban capital-labour ratio








































Again, (19) and (16) form a system of two equations in two unknowns, s and Lm.
144.2 Eﬃciency wages

















































 = y(km) − λF − ζ(
+
s;z,Π) (23)
A g a i n ,f o ra no p e nc a p i t a la c c o u n t ,w et r e a tkm as exogenous, so using (22), the relations
(16) and (23) form a system of two equations in s and Lm. For a closed capital account, from



































and (16) and (23) once again form a system of two equations in two unknowns.
One point to note about the systems of equations, in all four cases, is that the solutions for
search intensity and city size are independent of the severance payment P. The payment is a
pure transfer, and so changes in P are exactly oﬀset by a change in the formal sector wage in
the opposite direction, with no other eﬀect on equilibrium outcomes. Nevertheless, P will play
an important role in the baseline of the calibrated model. In matching diﬀerences in formal and
informal sector income (and hence utilities) we need to use not only microeconometric estimates
of wage diﬀerentials, based on hourly earnings, but also expected severance pay. We discuss
this in more detail in section 6 below.
4.3 Eﬃciency
As is well known, matching frictions imply the presence of nonpecuniary externalities to de-
cisions by workers and ﬁrms, and so the market equilibrium will typically be ineﬃcient. In
standard models, the decentralized equilibrium is eﬃcient only under the well-known Hosios
(1990) condition, namely that the surplus is allocated so that the worker’s share (β in the wage
bargaining case) is equal to the elasticity of the matching function with respect to su.A ss h o w n
in Appendix B, this condition also ensures eﬃciency in our model. This is not a surprise given
15the similarity between our setup and developed country models with endogenous participation,
in which eﬃciency can be established under the same condition (see for example Garibaldi and
Wasmer 2005).
In the open capital account case, we also have the standard property that when the Hosios
condition is not satisﬁe d ,t h el e v e lo fs e a r c hi st o ol o w .F r o m( 16), a corollary is that the size
of the city will then be too small. This is, however, not the case when the capital account is
closed. If formal sector employment rises, the ﬁxed capital stock implies that the capital-labour
ratio falls. This exerts a downwards force on formal sector productivity and wages that may
oﬀset other eﬀects, reducing eﬃciency and the welfare of unemployed workers. This feature of
the closed capital account case will also be evident in the comparative statics below. It implies
that, if the worker receives too much of the surplus, the level of search and consequently the
size of the city can be too large, and excess search intensity is associated with an ineﬃciently
high level of employment in the formal sector.
5C o m p a r a t i v e s t a t i c s
The following comparative statics are derived under the assumption that migration is costless
(B =0 ) and the equilibrium is unique. The more general case where B>0, which is slightly
more complicated, will be discussed at the end of this section.
F o rb o t ht h ew a g eb a r g a i n i n ga n de ﬃciency wage models, the migration condition (16) and
the job creation curve, (19) or (23), describe two curves in (s, Lm) space. Putting search
intensity s on the horizontal axis, the migration condition is upward sloping. The job creation
curve is downward sloping with a closed capital account, and vertical with an open capital
account. We provide an example in ﬁgure 1,f o rt h ee ﬀects of an increase in urban TFP, under
the assumption of Nash bargaining. Many of the comparative static results below are obtained
by analysing which way the job creation curves, (19) and (23), and the migration condition (16)
move following a parameter change.12
In studying eﬀects on the formal sector wage, we use a standard property of matching
models with Nash bargaining. The steady-state wage can be written as a weighted average
of the marginal product of labour and a worker’s outside option (for example, Merz 1995).
The wage moves closer to the marginal product of labour as the worker’s bargaining strength
increases. Here we have,
wm + λP = β(MPL− λF)+( 1− β)rU
= β(MPL− λF)+( 1− β)(wa + xa)
12In the closed capital account case, it is sometimes also helpful to draw the curves in (s,km) space, by inverting
(20) or (24) to express Lm as a function of km,sand parameters.
16Rise in : Aa Am MF c λ Π xa
Eﬀect on:
Migration Condition ↑ == = = = ↓↑
J o bC r e a t i o nC u r v e = ↑ ?/ ↑↓ ?/ ↓ ?/ ↓↓ =
s +/ =+ ? /+ − ?/− ?/−− +/ =
u −/ = −− + +++−/ =
Lm − +? /+ − ?/− ?/−− −
wa ++ ? /+ − ?/− ?/−− −
wm ++ ? /+ − ?/− ?/− ?/− +
(1 − u)Lm − ++ − −−−−
Table 1: Wage bargaining, with a closed/open capital account
where the left-hand side is formal sector labour income including expected severance pay, and
MPL denotes the marginal product of labour for a formal sector ﬁrm before expected ﬁring
costs are taken into account.13
Several points are worth brieﬂyn o t i n g .( 1) The question marks in tables 1 and 2 represent
genuine ambiguity, in that the relevant eﬀects may be positive or negative, depending on the
parametrization. (2) The results for the change in search costs Π are obtained under the
assumption that φ, the elasticity of search costs with respect to s, is constant. (3) Given that
the severance payment P is a pure transfer, inﬂuencing only the urban wage wm,w ed on o t
include it in the tables. (4) Neither do we study the eﬀect of an increase in self-employment
productivity (z): this always lowers search intensity and raises the unemployment rate, but
other eﬀects are harder to establish.14
It is interesting to note how the results in Table 1 a n d2c a nb eu s e dt ot h i n ka b o u tt h e
incidence of poverty. In the model, formal sector workers are better oﬀ than those in the
informal sector and agriculture (in steady-state, we have W>U ). If we think of a poverty
threshold deﬁned in utility terms to be above U and below W,t h e nt h en u m b e ri np o v e r t yi s
La +uLm =1−(1−u)Lm.O nt h i sd e ﬁnition, given a parameter change and holding xa ﬁxed,
suﬃcient conditions for a reduction in poverty are that formal sector employment (1 − u)Lm
increases and the rural wage does not fall.
We now discuss some of the comparative statics in more detail. First, we consider the eﬀects
of TFP growth in either the agricultural sector (an increase in Aa) or the formal sector (an
increase in Am). Not surprisingly, agricultural and formal sector wages rise in both cases. The
tables show that an improvement in agricultural TFP never raises the urban unemployment
r a t e ,a n dm a yr e d u c ei t . T h es i z eo ft h ec i t y( Lm) falls, as does formal sector employment
and the absolute number of workers in the informal sector. The search intensity (s)o ft h o s e
13These expressions follow from (2), (7), (10), the steady-state version of (11) and the bargaining solution (12).
14Similarly, it would not be straightforward to derive the eﬀects of changes in commodity prices: monetary
quantities such as wages would then need to be deﬂated by an appropriate price index. Given the 3 x 2 structure
of our model, the responses of real wages to price changes are likely to be ambiguous under general assumptions.
17Rise in : Aa Am MFc λ Π xa
Eﬀect on:
Migration Condition ↑ == = = = ↓↑
J o bC r e a t i o nC u r v e = ↑↑ ↓ ↓ ?/ ↓↓ =
s +/ =+ + −−?/−−+/ =
u −/ = −− +++ +−/ =
Lm − ++ −−?/−−−
wa ++ + −−?/−−−
wm ++ + −−?/−−+
(1 − u)Lm − ++ −−− −−
Table 2: Eﬃciency wages, with a closed/open capital account
remaining in the informal sector does not fall, and may rise.
The eﬀects of an increase in formal sector TFP are more complex: although this favourable
productivity shock reduces the urban unemployment rate, the improvement in prospects en-
courages rural-urban migration. The city size increases, and agricultural wages rise, so that
the incidence of poverty is reduced; but total unemployment does not necessarily fall, leaving
open the Todaro paradox as a possibility. Another eﬀect of increased productivity in the formal
sector is that workers in the informal sector search more actively.
Overall, growth tends to reduce or leave unchanged the relative importance of the informal
sector in urban employment, but because of the migration response, growth in the formal sector
may increase the absolute number of people in the informal sector. These responses are not
dissimilar to those in the Harris-Todaro model. Agricultural growth is “labour intensive” but
urban growth, potentially, is not.
One strength of our analysis, relative to the Harris-Todaro model, is a more detailed speciﬁ-
cation of the urban labour market. Turning to some of the relevant parameters, we ﬁrst consider
an improvement in matching eﬃciency (M). In three cases, an improvement in matching eﬃ-
ciency lowers the urban unemployment rate and raises wages, the size of the city, and formal
sector employment. These eﬀects might all be regarded as natural consequences of reduced
f r i c t i o n si nt h eu r b a nl a b o u rm a r k e t . B u tt h ee ﬀects are ambiguous for the case of a closed
capital account with wage bargaining. This relates to our earlier discussion in section 4.3. With
a ﬁxed capital stock, the increase in formal sector employment will exert downwards pressure
on wages, and this eﬀect may be strong enough to reduce the welfare of informal sector workers.
Although not inevitable, these counterintuitive results will be encountered in our calibration
below.
Increases in the job expiry rate (λ)o rt h eﬁring cost parameter (F) raise the urban un-
e m p l o y m e n tr a t ea n d ,i nt h ec a s eo fj o be x p i r y ,a l s or e d u c es t e a d y - s t a t ee m p l o y m e n ti nt h e
formal sector. Again, these are natural results: for example, the increase in the job expiry rate
will increase the eﬀective discount rate of workers and ﬁrms, reducing entry by ﬁrms, all else
18constant.
Finally, we note that when the ﬁxed migration cost B is strictly positive, there may be
no migration ﬂows in response to the parameter changes described above, depending on the
size of the shock. For example, suppose we are in an equilibrium where past migration has
occurred from agriculture to the city and therefore wa +xa = rU − rB. A small positive shock
to agricultural productivity will not result in any reverse migration, if the increase in the rural
wage does not cover the ﬂow value of the migration cost - in other words, if w0
a +xa −rB ≤ rU
where w0
a is the new rural wage. Since the urban sector remains the same size, and the shock to
agricultural productivity does not otherwise aﬀect the urban labour market, the urban sector
and the present value of unemployment remain unaﬀected. For migration to occur in this
example, the agricultural wage would have to rise by a quantity exceeding 2rB,a n dt h e n
migration would cease when wa + xa − rB = rU.
6 Model parameterization
This section describes the assumptions under which the model is calibrated. We will be inter-
ested in whether the calibrated model can match the size of the informal sector seen in the data,
even though workers could choose to locate in agriculture, and ﬁrms could choose to create new
vacancies. This makes the choice of parameters more than usually important. We calibrate the
model to match key features of the Mexican economy in 1990. Kose et al. (2004, p. 27-28) argue
that Mexico’s labour market rigidities have been a signiﬁcant factor in limiting the size of the
formal sector. As we noted in the introduction, one advantage of the Mexican case is that we
can use recent microeconometric evidence in selecting structural parameters and constraining
equilibrium outcomes.
We will show that the matching model can match a large informal sector (30% of the urban
workforce) provided that either workers receive a relatively large share of the match surplus,
or that the costs of posting a vacancy are suﬃciently high; either of these will be suﬃcient to
limit entry by ﬁrms to the required level. In order to see whether the model can match the data
under plausible assumptions, we will infer the required allocation of the surplus directly from
the baseline of the calibrated model, rather than use the more standard approach in which the
division of the match surplus is treated as known.
The calibration is carried out for four cases, corresponding to the two models of formal sec-
tor wage determination, and two diﬀerent assumptions about the capital account (open/closed).
Clearly, the model is stylized, and so our calculations are intended as only illustrative. Among
the important considerations we abstract from are heterogeneity in worker productivity, female
nonparticipation in the labour force, oﬀ-farm employment in rural areas, and international
emigration.15 The simplicity of the exercise also has some advantages, however. The assump-
15Levy and van Wijnbergen (1994, p. 268) argue that rural-urban migration has been the main driving force
19tions and mechanisms are relatively transparent, and we can relate the ﬁndings directly to the
comparative static results established in section 5 of the paper.
We use microeconometric evidence to select some parameter values, and choose other para-
meters so that the model’s equilibrium outcomes match those seen in the data. In particular
we choose some structural parameters so that the model’s equilibrium will match the observed
size of the informal sector in Mexico, the observed size of the agricultural sector, and estimates
of wage diﬀerentials from recent microeconometric studies. The calibration assumptions and
procedure are described in more detail in a technical appendix, available on request.
The main parameter assumptions are listed in Table 3. We set the annual real interest rate
at 4%, a standard choice in calibrating macroeconomic models (for example, Andolfatto 1996).
For simplicity, we specialize to Cobb-Douglas technologies in the formal and rural sectors, a
Cobb-Douglas matching function, and a simple power function for the costs of search intensity.
The matching function is m(su,v)=M(su)γv1−γ and we set the elasticity γ to 0.50, a common
choice in calibrations for developed countries. For search costs, we specialize to
σ(s,z)=zh(s)
This has the following interpretation: z is the income associated with full-time self-employment
in the informal sector, but a proportion of a worker’s time, h(s), is devoted to searching for
a job in the formal sector, and so zh(s) is the income foregone in the process of search. We
specify a simple power function h(s)=Πsφ where our calibration will assume φ =2based on
the empirical analysis in Yashiv (2000). Without loss of generality, we choose units for search
intensity s such that its initial level can be normalized to one.
We want the model to yield the informal sector’s share of the urban workforce (u)a s0 . 3 0 ,
based on the estimate of Gong and van Soest (2002) for the early 1990s. We discuss this choice
in more detail, later in this section. The agricultural employment share La is set to be 0.28,
b a s e do nI L Od a t af o r1990 extracted from the online LABORSTA database.
The monthly job expiry rate λ is set at 0.06, again based on Gong and van Soest (2002).
Together λ and u pin down steady-state matches m = λ(1 − u) as a fraction of the urban
workforce. A more diﬃcult choice relates to the duration of vacancies. There is little information
on this for developing countries, given data limitations and our necessarily broad interpretation
of what is meant by a “vacancy”. Here we follow Andolfatto (1996) and Merz (1995) in imposing
an average duration of 45 days.16 This pins down the vacancy rate v and, given knowledge of
m, s and u, this means that we can also pin down the matching eﬃciency index M.
in Mexico’s rapid urban growth, with the number of such migrants far in excess of the number emigrating to the
USA. It would be straightforward to extend our analysis to consider the impact of emigration on the domestic
labour market.
16This ﬁgure comes from a study of the Dutch economy by van Ours and Ridder (1992). This may be
conservative: our broad interpretation of a vacancy might suggest that longer durations are plausible, and we
could then match the observed size of the informal sector while assuming smaller ﬂow costs of posting a vacancy.
20Another key parameter will be the ﬂow cost of posting a vacancy, c. We use an approach
similar to Andolfatto (1996) and impose the ratio of recruiting costs to formal sector output
in the baseline steady-state (cv/Ym in our notation). It is important to emphasize that our
calibration is quite sensitive to the choice of this ratio. As the size of recruiting costs is pro-
gressively reduced, we need workers to receive a larger allocation of the surplus (reducing entry
by ﬁrms) if we are to continue matching an informal sector employment share of 30%. For
our baseline calibration, we set the ratio at 3%, compared to Andolfatto’s use of 1%f o rt h e
US economy. This diﬀerence might be justiﬁed if recruiting formal sector workers is a costlier
process in developing countries than in the US, for example, because systems for transmitting
information about labour market opportunities are weaker. Nevertheless, we will examine how
our conclusions are modiﬁed by the alternative choice of 1%.
The model includes a role for ﬁring costs, F. These represent a direct resource cost to the
ﬁrm associated with job expiry. We set these costs at twice the monthly wage at baseline,
so that it will have a similar order of magnitude to severance pay. We set the severance pay
parameter P to be four times the monthly wage. This is motivated by Mexico’s labour market
regulations: in essence, a ﬁrm that dismisses a worker without just cause must pay the worker
three’ months salary plus twenty days of salary for each year worked (for example, Capelleja
1997). Our estimate of the monthly job expiry rate implies an average job duration of almost
17 months in the formal sector, so that setting P at four times the monthly wage is a reasonable
approximation.17
As discussed earlier, assumptions about formal sector severance pay have some relevance
for our calibration. In ﬁtting Mexican data, an attractive aspect of our model is that work-
ers will strictly prefer the formal sector even when there is no formal sector wage premium,
because formal sector labour income includes expected severance pay as well as hourly wages.
Microeconometric estimates of the wage premium in the Mexican formal sector, relative to the
informal sector, suggest that it is low after controlling for worker characteristics, at least for
unskilled workers. With this in mind, we set the formal sector wage premium at 10%.18
Using labour force survey data for 1991, extracted from the ILO LABORSTA database, we
ﬁnd that the formal sector wage is roughly 80% higher than the rural wage. This assumption is
broadly in line with the computable general equilibrium model of Mexico due to Venables and
van Wijnbergen (1993), who assumed that the marginal product for unskilled labour in urban
areas was twice that in rural areas.
17Given that severance payments are always proportional to salaries, the lump-sum P is forced to rise or fall
in proportion to the formal sector wage when studying how the economy responds to a parameter change.
18Marcouiller et al. (1997) ﬁnd that, if anything, there is a wage premium associated with the informal sector
in Mexico. Our model can accommodate this possibility, given severance pay. Gong and van Soest (2002) ﬁnd
very low formal sector wage premia for individuals with low or intermediate levels of education, and signiﬁcantly
larger premia for those with a high level of education. The latter account for 19% of the men and 7% of the
women in their sample. In principle, allowing for this heterogeneity would be desirable, but it would complicate
the model and the comparative statics.
21With the formal sector-rural wage premium at 80% and the estimated formal-informal pre-
mium of just 10%, even the informal sector wage is greater than the rural wage. This is consistent
with the observations of Gregory (1980) and Mazumdar (1976) that productivity and/or wages
in the informal sector may often exceed those in agriculture. In order to match the rural popu-
lation observed in Mexico, our calibration then requires migration costs B and the direct utility
cost of living in the city xa to be suﬃciently high to deter migration. A necessary condition
is that xa + χrB > 0 where the parameter χ i sd e s c r i b e di nf o o t n o t e10. We infer the value
of xa + χrB in the calibration exercise but cannot separately identify the values of B and xa.
Later in the calibration, we will allow the preference parameter xa to be heterogeneous.
Finally, we need to specify the technologies in the formal and rural sectors. We choose both
to be Cobb-Douglas for simplicity. We impose the elasticities of output with respect to labour
for the formal sector and the agricultural sector. Here we face a problem common to other
modellers of the Mexican economy, namely that the aggregate capital share provided in the
national accounts seems too high at around 70% (for discussion of this, see Kehoe and Kehoe
1994). This is also true of UNIDO data on the capital share for the Mexican manufacturing
sector, which makes a rigorous choice of technology parameters diﬃcult. Rather than choose the
relevant parameters freely, we use the same choices as Imam and Whalley (1985), a calibration
of the Harris-Todaro model using Mexican data.19
We choose units for agricultural output so that we can normalize the agricultural TFP
parameter to unity. Without loss of generality, we also normalize to unity the initial stocks
of capital and land, and then infer the level of TFP in the formal sector that is needed for
the equilibrium of the model to replicate the observed sectoral employment structure.20 We do
not seek to match agriculture’s share of GDP. In calibrating the model, we typically ﬁnd that
it signiﬁcantly over-predicts the share of agriculture in GDP for Mexico relative to national
accounts data. This might be explained in terms of home production or subsistence agriculture,
the output of which is not fully captured in the national accounts. Moreover, the data on
employment allocations may overstate the proportion of eﬀective labour allocated to agriculture.
These and other relevant considerations are discussed in Gollin et al. (2004), Parente et al.
(2000) and Schmitt (1989).
Our parameter choices have an important implication. Given the rapid turnover between the
informal sector and the formal sector observed in Mexico, and a low discount rate, the utility
levels of formal sector and informal sector workers are similar at the baseline steady-state. The
19 The current model does not have a one-to-one correspondence between the formal sector’s input elasticities
and its factor shares, given that formal sector labour does not receive its marginal product; we brieﬂyd i s c u s s
this issue in our technical appendix (available on request).
20Strictly speaking, we infer urban TFP multiplied by the relative price of formal sector output. In the
calibration, this quantity has to move to oﬀset any change to the levels of land and urban capital, given that
we constrain the model’s equilibrium to match the observed sectoral structure. This means that equilibrium
outcomes such as relative wages are independent of the scale of the ﬁxed factors: any change in scaling only
aﬀects the absolute level of wages and output.
22formal sector “utility premium” (W−U)/U is very small, 0.75% at baseline. Hence the informal
sector, although less productive, yields lifetime utility similar to that obtained in the formal
sector. This result is not inconsistent with some of the available evidence for Mexico, which
suggests that the diﬀerent urban sectors are well integrated and not fundamentally distinct in
terms of their desirability (for example, Bosch and Maloney 2005).
The similarity in lifetime utility indicates that, at least for the speciﬁcc a s eo fM e x i c o ,
informality is less interesting as a cause of poverty, and more as a cause of low productivity.21
With this in mind, our calibration emphasizes the eﬀects of parameter changes on productivity
and labour income. The relative size of the formal sector is also of interest from a welfare
point of view. An expansion in the formal sector could have beneﬁcial eﬀects beyond those we
consider here, including better opportunities for specialization and training, and greater income
security, as discussed in a World Development Report (World Bank, 1995, p.18).
In the experiments we carry out, the productivity eﬀects are driven by reallocations of
employment across sectors. These reallocations can have sizeable eﬀects, because our baseline
implies that the marginal product of labour in the formal sector is roughly 1.6 times that in the
informal sector and 2.6 times that in agriculture. (The presence of matching frictions means that
workers in the formal sector receive only about 70% of their marginal product in the baseline
equilibrium.) Reallocating labour from sectors where its marginal product is relatively low will
usually raise aggregate output and total factor productivity. Whenever the Hosios condition is
not met, this has the potential to raise social welfare.
The preceding discussion points to a shortcoming of our model, at least in its application
to Mexico. One view of developing country labour markets distinguishes between two tiers of
self-employment (Fields 1990). The lower tier is a staging post for salaried work in the formal
sector (as in our paper) and the upper tier corresponds to forms of self-employment that may
be actively preferred to the formal sector (which we do not explicitly model). For example,
some individuals may accumulate capital and human capital while working in the formal sector,
and then quit voluntarily to set up their own business. Fields (1990) calls this ‘restricted-entry
self-employment’ and Maloney (1998, 1999, 2002) emphasizes the relevance of the upper tier to
understanding the Mexican informal sector. In contrast, McKenzie and Woodruﬀ (2004) use a
detailed survey of micro-enterprises in Mexico to show that the capital requirements for entry
are low in many sectors, suggesting that entry into any upper tier must be restricted in other
ways.
Nevertheless, in calibrating the model, we should be careful to avoid identifying the informal
sector with all forms of self-employment. As discussed above, our baseline calibration assumes
21Sethuraman (1976) pointed out that the consequences of the informal sector for overall resource allocation
and productivity were too often overlooked. Looking across countries, Maloney (1998, 2002) shows that there
is a strong inverse association between industrial labour productivity and the extent of self-employment. This
suggests that labour markets, sectoral structure and productivity are tightly connected, even though the direction
of causality remains unclear.
23that the informal sector represents 30% of the urban workforce. This ﬁgure corresponds to the
job-type deﬁnition of informality used by Gong and van Soest (2002), in which the self-employed
are classiﬁed as informal sector workers only if their ﬁrm has no employees. Any enterpreneur
with at least one employee is placed in the formal sector category. This yields a smaller informal
sector than the combined share of self-employment and employment in micro-enterprises, which
is reported by Maloney (2002) to be close to 50% for Mexico; hence, the diﬀerence between
the two could partly reﬂect an upper tier to the informal sector. Our model is eﬀectively
aggregating salaried employees and business owners into one formal, capital-intensive sector,
while the informal sector continues to represent a low-productivity staging post, and accounts
for a smaller share of the urban workforce than the combined share of self-employment and
micro-enterprises.22 This is an imperfect solution, but deﬁning the upper tier of the informal
sector as part of the formal sector is in line with most previous work, and simpliﬁes the analysis
throughout the paper.23
Given our focus on productivity eﬀects, we end this section by brieﬂyn o t i n gh o ww em e a s u r e
output (net of recruitment costs) and factor incomes. For the formal sector, there is a distinction





cvLm − λF(1 − u)Lm = rmKm +( wm + λP)(1 − u)Lm
This says that formal sector output net of recruitment and ﬁring costs (the left-hand-side)
is equal to factor incomes (the right-hand-side). When this quantity is added to agricultural
output and informal sector output, we have a measure of domestic output (GDP).
When the capital account is open, it is essential to distinguish between GDP and GNP.
The response of domestic output to a parameter change will usually diﬀer from the response of
domestic factor incomes. Although labour income and land rentals may change, capital income
for domestic residents is ﬁxed: their capital income is simply equal to their holdings of capital
multiplied by the world return. Any increase in capital income will accrue to foreign owners of
capital. This means we can easily compute changes in national income (GNP) for parameter
experiments with an open capital account: to calculate the new value of GNP, we hold the
capital income accruing to domestic residents at its initial level, and then add the new value of
labour income. To allow simple presentation of the results in terms of percentage changes, we
assume that GDP equals GNP at baseline (net foreign assets are initially zero, and there are
22This is also relevant to the idea that many self-employed entrepreneurs in the informal sector arrive by
voluntary quits (Cunningham and Maloney 2001). If some of these entrepreneurs are using capital-intensive
technologies then, in our model, we can interpret their movements as job-to-job transitions within the formal
sector.
23Fields (1990) noted that constructing a model with several tiers to the informal sector, and the possibility of
capital accumulation prior to entering the upper tier, is a formidable task. One of his suggestions, to use Markov
chains to link the sectors, could be seen as a reduced-form for the explicit modelling of transitions that we adopt
in this paper. See also Krebs and Maloney (1999).
24no cross-border labour services).
7C a l i b r a t i o n
The ﬁrst question of interest is whether the model can explain an informal sector employment
share of 30% and an agricultural employment share of 28% under reasonable assumptions. We
can achieve this, under two conditions: ﬁrst, there must be a signiﬁcant migration cost or urban
disutility; and second, either the ﬂow costs of worker recruitment must be high, or workers must
receive a relatively large share of the match surplus. Taking these conditions in turn, at baseline,
our assumptions imply that the disutility cost of urban living, together with the migration cost,
is equivalent to 95% of the rural wage. This is required to ensure that a substantial fraction of
the population remains in agriculture, despite the higher wage available in the urban informal
sector.
In the Nash bargaining model, the baseline equilibrium requires worker bargaining strength
(β) to be 0.67, higher than the 0.50 value which is the norm in calibrations for developed
countries. In the eﬃciency wage case, the required division of the surplus may seem more
reasonable. For example, if we assume a monthly detection probability of 5%, the same division
of the surplus can be achieved with a gain from shirking that is just 12% of the formal sector
wage at the baseline equilibrium.
Our baseline assumptions imply that the ﬂow cost of posting a vacancy is high, at 62% of the
formal sector wage: this conﬁrms the potential importance of interpreting a “vacancy” broadly,
so that recruitment costs extend beyond an advertisement. Recall that the vacancy cost ﬁgure
is derived by constraining the steady-state ratio of recruitment costs to formal sector output to
3%. If we lower this ratio to the 1% ﬁgure used by Andolfatto (1996) for the USA, the required
vacancy cost falls to 20% of the formal sector wage. This change has a signiﬁcant drawback,
however. To continue explaining the large size of the informal sector, we then need formal sector
workers to receive a higher share of the match surplus. In the Nash bargaining case, we need
β to be as high as 0.86. The experiments we describe below are all for the alternative case in
which the recruitment costs ratio is 3% and the division of the surplus corresponds to a β of
two-thirds.
Our experiments will consider how changes in key parameters aﬀect the labour market equi-
librium, wage diﬀerentials and search intensity, the sectoral structure of output and employment,
and total output. When the capital account is open, aspects of the model economy such as do-
mestic output can respond dramatically to parameter changes. As noted in the previous section,
it is important to focus on changes in GNP rather than GDP in this case.
The ﬁrst experiment we consider is a 20% increase in agricultural TFP (rural growth).
T h er e s u l t sa r es h o w ni nT a b l e4 . A se x p e c t e d( g i v e nﬁxed commodity prices) agricultural
employment and output increases substantially, but there is some reduction in the output of
25the formal and informal sectors. With an open capital account, the city is simply scaled down
in size, with the urban unemployment rate, matching rate, and wage premia all independent of
rural TFP. For the closed account case, the urban unemployment rate decreases and the informal
sector contracts, while aggregate output rises by approximately 2.6%. However, looking across
the table, rural growth is potentially “immiserizing”. Workers are left worse oﬀ in the open
capital account case: although all wage rates remain unchanged in the new equilibrium, total
labour income declines, because fewer workers are employed in the relatively well-paid jobs in
the formal sector.
In the second experiment, reported in Table 5, urban TFP rises by 20% (urban growth).
Importantly, the urban unemployment rate falls sharply. Agricultural and informal sector em-
ployment contract, while employment and output in the formal sector expand: at least in this
calibration, urban growth is labour-intensive, pulling workers out of the informal sector. Wages
and labour income rise dramatically in the open capital account case. This is because the direct
eﬀect of the increase in urban TFP is ampliﬁed by capital inﬂows: the formal sector capital-
labour ratio must rise until the return on capital is back at its baseline value, the world real
interest rate.24 When the capital account is open, GDP roughly doubles in response to the
20% increase in urban TFP, but most of this increase in GDP is returned to foreign owners of
capital. GNP rises by roughly 30%.
We now consider the eﬀects of varying some of the key labour market parameters. We ﬁrst
look at an increase in matching eﬃciency (the shift parameter M in the matching function)
of 20%. To what extent is better matching associated with improved outcomes in the urban
and rural labour markets? Table 6 quantiﬁes the reduction in the urban unemployment rate,
while formal sector output and employment expands. Our earlier comparative statics indicated
that the eﬀect on wages is ambiguous in one case, that of Nash bargaining with a closed capital
account. We ﬁnd an example of this counter-intuitive result here: better matching increases
formal sector employment, but this reduces the capital-labour ratio suﬃciently that wages fall.
In the other three cases, wages rise. In all four cases, aggregate output and national income
i n c r e a s e . W i t ha no p e nc a p i t a la c c o u n t ,t h ee ﬀect of better matching on labour income is
substantial: labour income rises by 4.6% under bargaining, and by 5.4% under eﬃciency wages.
This partly reﬂects a general equilibrium eﬀect in that rural wages rise by 5%-7%.
Our baseline includes relatively modest ﬁring costs in the formal sector, equivalent to two
months’ wages. If these ﬁring costs are halved, we get the results shown in Table 7, including
an expansion in formal sector output and employment, a reduction in the urban unemployment
rate, and an increase in aggregate output and national income. Wages rise in the formal
sector (by 1.4% to 4.4%, depending on the model) and in the agricultural sector (by 3.1%t o
8.9%). Again we see that, in general equilibrium, labour market institutions in the urban sector
24With Cobb-Douglas technologies, this eﬀect will be especially powerful when the urban capital exponent θ is
high, because the factor increase in the capital-labour ratio is equal to the factor increase in urban TFP raised
to the power 1/(1 − θ).
26inﬂuence the standard of living in rural areas.
Our ﬁnal experiment is a 20% increase in the job expiry rate, from a monthly Poisson rate
of 0.06, to one of 0.072. This increase may appear modest, but it has sizeable eﬀects. Output
and employment in the formal sector falls, and total labour income falls by as much as 8.5%
in the open capital account case. The informal sector expands in relative and absolute terms,
rising from 30% of the urban workforce to somewhere between 34% and 43% depending on the
model. Wages fall in both agriculture and the formal sector. In this model, even quite modest
increases in the job expiry rate have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the labour market equilibrium, and
on aggregate output and national income.
Finally, given the strong response of “city size” in some of the experiments, we brieﬂy
discuss the possibility that location preferences (captured in xa) may be heterogeneous across
the population of workers. This is a straightforward extension of our analysis. Assume that
xa has a distribution function F(xa) which is continuous and strictly increasing over its entire
support. Let x∗
a be the preference parameter of the agricultural worker who is indiﬀerent about
migrating. All workers with xa <x ∗
a will live in the city, while those with xa ≥ x∗




Given our assumptions about F(.) then x∗
a can be expressed as a continuous function of
Lm, x∗
a(Lm). W ec a nt h e nr e p l a c exa with x∗
a throughout the previous analysis. In describing

















To implement this idea in the calibration, we need to specify a distribution for F(xa).W e
have experimented with a normal distribution in which the variance is imposed, while the mean
is treated as an unknown parameter that can be inferred from the observed size of the city.
When we introduce heterogeneity in this way and study the eﬀects of parameter changes, the
responsiveness of city size is altered (as expected) but the eﬀects on outcomes within the urban
labour market, such as the relative size of the informal sector, appear modest.
8 Conclusions
Agénor (1996, 2004, 2005a), Fields (1984) and Freeman (1992) have argued strongly that too
little attention has been paid to the interactions between labour markets and aggregate devel-
opment. In this paper, we have described a simple general equilibrium framework in which an
urban labour market with matching frictions is embedded in a 3 x 2 speciﬁc factors model,
with an urban sector and a rural agricultural sector. Ths speciﬁcation of the urban labour
market provides a uniﬁed approach to the analysis of labour markets and underemployment for
27developed and developing countries, and allows us to draw on recent microeconometric studies
of labour market transitions and wage diﬀerentials.
For middle-income countries, at least, matching frictions in the urban labour market can help
to explain the existence of a sizeable informal sector. Taking the example of Mexico, informal
sector employment is often estimated to account for as much as 30% of the urban workforce.
Our calibration shows that this can be explained solely in terms of matching frictions, provided
either that workers receive a relatively large share of the match surplus, or that recruitment
costs are signiﬁcant: 3% of formal sector output in our main calibration.
The model allows us to consider a range of questions of central importance to development
economics, while acknowledging the interdependence of sectors. These questions include the
eﬀects of diﬀerent types of growth on employment, the informal sector, sectoral structure,
urbanization, labour income and total output. We have also studied the eﬀects of labour
market parameters on equilibrium outcomes, to see whether labour market institutions are an
important determinant of sectoral structure and overall productivity. Even relatively modest
changes in labour market parameters can have sizeable eﬀects, especially for total labour income.
It would be straightforward to adapt our model to consider distributional issues, including
the eﬀects of growth on inequality. More ambitiously, further work could signiﬁcantly improve
on our analysis by developing a richer model of the informal sector, perhaps incorporating
several tiers to self-employment, and the role of business regulation. Finally, since our analysis
suggests that labour market institutions can have signiﬁcant eﬀects on aggregate outcomes,
there is a case for examining the same eﬀe c t sf o rp o o r e re c o n o m i e s .T h a tm i g h tw e l lr e q u i r ea
more complex approach to the urban labour market and the rural sector than we have developed
here.
AS t a b i l i t y
This Appendix establishes that the equilibrium is saddle-path stable when B =0 .T h e n a
natural assumption is that the instantaneous change in the urban labour force is given by
˙ Lm = θ(rU − (wa + xa)) (26)
which might follow if the parameter b (introduced in the discussion preceeding equation 2)
is strictly positive. Note that our results on stability do not rely on the linearity in (26). It
is also important to note that U in equation (26) represents the welfare of a worker in urban
unemployment who does not migrate, so that (3) continues to describe the evolution of U.
In equation (11), y(km) is output per ﬁlled job less the rental cost of capital; this can
also be interpreted as the marginal product of labour. With an open capital account km and
hence y(km) will be exogenously determined by the world real interest rate. With a closed
capital account, since y(km) is an increasing function of capital per employed worker and the
28urban capital stock is ﬁxed, it can also be expressed as a decreasing function of formal sector
employment Em =( 1− u)Lm.W eu s ey(
−
Em) to denote this decreasing function.
From standard properties of the matching function, q(τ) and τq(τ) are respectively decreas-
ing and increasing in τ. F r o m( 8 ) ,w ec a ns h o wt h a ts e a r c hi n t e n s i t ys, and therefore sτq(τ),
are increasing functions of τ; this argument uses the eﬃciency wage condition (13), or the Nash
wage bargain combined with the fact that J = c/q(τ), as appropriate.
With a closed capital account, we then have
(r + λ)(J + W − U)=y(Em
−
) − z − ζ(τ
+)+(˙ J + ˙ W − ˙ U) (27)











while with eﬃciency wages we have
(r + λ)(J + X)=y(Em
−
) − z − ζ(τ
+)+ ˙ J (29)
In either case, it follows from (10) and either (28) or (29), that ˙ τ is an increasing function
of τ and a decreasing function of Em.W i t ha no p e nc a p i t a la c c o u n t ,s i n c ey(km) is exogenous,
˙ τ is just an increasing function of τ. We also note that from (9), ˙ U is an increasing function of
U and τ.
The evolution of formal sector employment is given by
˙ Em = mLm − λEm = sτq(τ)(Lm − Em) − λEm (30)
F i n a l l yw ec o n s i d e rt h ei n s t a n t a n e o u sc h a n g ei nt h es i z eo ft h ec i t y , ˙ Lm. The two endogenous
variables that determine this are (positively) the present value of urban unemployment U and
(negatively) the agricultural wage, where the latter is an increasing function of city size Lm.
These arguments combine so that, after taking a ﬁrst order linear approximation around
the steady state, we obtain a system of the following sign pattern in the variables τ,U,Lm and
Em: 
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
where A41 =0when the capital account is open, and A41 > 0 when it is closed.
We want to show that there are two eigenvalues with negative real part corresponding
to the two predetermined variables Lm and Em, and two eigenvalues with positive real part
29corresponding to the jump variables τ and U, so that the system is saddle-path stable and
determinate. This is clear by inspection for the open capital account case, where A41 =0and
A is triangular, so the eigenvalues are just the diagonal elements of A.
With a closed capital account where A41 > 0, the proof is slightly more involved. The
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2 , where f(λ) ≡ det(A−λI)
is the characteristic polynomial.
BE ﬃciency
It is useful to review how the decentralized equilibrium depends on intial conditions. If the city
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+ xa − rB = ζ(
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s;z,Π) (32)
There is also an intermediate case where no migration occurs, where the urban labour market

















+ xa + rB.
In our eﬃciency analysis, we assume that the social planner can engineer a ﬂow of workers f
from agriculture to the city, with associated costs of migration. We ﬁrst consider the case where
the city is initially small and so f>0; we consider other cases later. The stock variables (here
both unemployment and the size of the city) are the state variables, and the social planner’s
control variables are search intensity s, vacancy creation, which can be seen as choosing τ, and
the number of migrants f.
We make the standard assumption that the social planner maximises the present discounted





Ya(La)+Laxa − Bf − bf2 +( 1− La)
©
1 − u)yX




Here Ya(a) is agricultural production, and Laxa is the utility beneﬁt of living in rural areas,






is formal sector output per worker in the closed capital account case (X =0 )a n dt h e
marginal product of labour in the open capital account case (X =1 ). The quantity yX
m will be
the aspect of formal sector output that a social planner seeks to inﬂuence. When the capital
account is open, domestic allocations do not aﬀect the capital income that accrues to domestic
residents. Hence, the social planner can disregard capital income in solving for the optimum
allocation. With a closed capital account, the social planner cares about the entirety of formal
sector output, given that capital is domestically owned and the return on this capital may vary.
















for X =0 ,1 where (as in the main text) y(km)=Amf(km) − Amf0(km)km or the marginal
product of labour.
The social planner’s control variables are f, s and τ, and the state variables are u and La.
The constraints are given by




{(1 − u)La} = λ(1 − u) − m + f
which gives




Hence the aim of the social planner is to maximize the welfare criterion (33) subject to
the constraints (36) and (37), which capture the inertia in the size of the city and the urban
unemployment rate.
Writing ψe−rt as the costate variable for La and µe−rt as the costate variable for u,t h e
current value Hamiltonian is:















31Using η to denote the elasticity of the matching function with respect to search eﬀort su
( w h i c hi st h en e g a t i v eo ft h ee l a s t i c i t yo fq with respect to τ) the maximum principle gives the
following ﬁrst order conditions:
∂H
∂τ =0:
(1 − La)c = −µq(τ)(1 − η) (41)
∂H
∂s =0:
(1 − La)[σs(s;z)+cτ]=−µτq(τ) (42)
∂H
∂f =0:





∂u = rµ− ˙ µ, using (34):
(1 − La)[−y(km)+z − σ(s;z) − csτ + λF]=µ(r + λ + sτq(τ)+
f
1 − La
) − ˙ µ (44)
∂H
∂La = rψ − ˙ ψ, using (35):
wa(La)+xa − {(1 − u)y(km)+u(z − σ(s;z)) − csuτ − λ(1 − u)F} − µf
(1 − u)
(1 − La)2 = rψ − ˙ ψ
(45)





In steady state ˙ τ =0 , ˙ u =0and f = ˙ La =0 . This implies ˙ µ =0from (41)a n d ˙ ψ =0from
(43). Also, from (37)
λ(1 − u)=suτq(τ)=m (47)












The steady state version of (45) is given by






32Substituting for y(km) in (49) from (48), we get











+ u(z − σ(s;z)) − csuτ
From (47), we then have








+ z − σ(s;z) − csuτ (50)
= z − σ(s;z)+
ηcsτ
1 − η
When the capital account is open, km is exogenous and equations (46), (47), (48) and (50)
yield the eﬃcient values of s,u, τ and La which we denote s∗,u ∗,τ ∗ and L∗
a. With a closed




(1 − La)(1 − u)
(51)




We will now show that the decentralized outcome is eﬃcient if and only if the Hosios condi-
tion (52) holds. By comparing equations (46), (47), (48) and (50) with equations (17), (15), (19)
and (31), we can see that for both cases that the steady state decentralized values sdec,u dec,
τdec and Ldec
a equal the eﬃcient values if and only if the surplus in the decentralized equilibrium
is shared according to the Hosios condition,
(1 − η)(W − U)=η(J − V ) (52)
In the eﬃciency wage case, this occurs iﬀ X is at the appropriate value. With wage bar-
gaining it occurs iﬀ we have the well-known Hosios (1990) condition that β = η.
We now consider the case where the size of the city is initially large relative to the equilib-
rium. For the social planner, f is now negative and we replace the migration costs term −Bf in
equations (33) and (38) with +Bf. This results in a migration condition for the social planner
that is
wa(La)+xa − rB = z − σ(s;z)+
ηcsτ
1 − η
Again the decentralized equilibrium, now given by equations (17), (15), (19) and (32), is ef-
ﬁcient if and only if the Hosios condition holds. A similar argument can be made for the
intermediate case; whatever the initial conditions, the decentralized equilibrium will replicate
the social planner’s outcome if and only if the Hosios condition holds. Finally, we note that
it is straightforward to show that this remains the case when xa is heterogeneous across the
population.
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This figure illustrates the comparative static results associated with a 20% increase in 
TFP in the urban sector, for the Nash Bargaining case, with either a closed or open 
capital account. The upward sloping line corresponds to the migration condition. It is 
the same for both the open and closed capital account, and does not move in response 
to the shock. The job creation curve (JCC) is downward sloping (closed capital account) 
or vertical (open capital account) and moves in the indicated direction in response to 
the increase in urban TFP. 
Table 3. The assumptions used in the calibration 
 
 
Constrained parameters/baseline outcomes  Value  Source 
    
Exponent on labour (agriculture)  0.37  Imam and Whalley (1985) 
Exponent on labour (formal sector)    0.42  Imam and Whalley (1985) 
Agricultural employment share (La)     0.28  ILO LABORSTA, 1990  
Informal sector share of urban labour (u)   0.30  Gong and van Soest (2002) 
    
Annual interest rate (r)        0.04  Standard 
Matching function elasticity (γ)  0.50 Standard 
Monthly job separation rate (λ)     0.06  Gong and van Soest (2002) 
Monthly vacancy fill rate (ratio of matches to vacancies)  0.50  Andolfatto (1996, p. 121)  
Recruitment costs/formal sector output    0.03  See text 
Firing costs/formal sector wage  2.00  See text 
Severance pay/formal sector wage  4.00  Capelleja (1997) – see text  
Search cost elasticity (φ)  2.00  Yashiv (2000, p. 1311) 
       
Formal sector wage/rural wage  1.80  ILO LABORSTA, 1991  
Formal sector wage/informal sector wage    1.10  See text 
    
  
 
Table 4. The effects of raising agricultural TFP by 20% 
 
 
    Closed capital account  Open capital account 
  Baseline New (NB) New (EW)  New (NB) New (EW)
       
Urban unemployment rate  0.30 0.27 0.27  0.30 0.30
Vacancy rate  0.08 0.09 0.10  0.08 0.08
Matching rate  0.04 0.04 0.04  0.04 0.04
        
Formal-informal wage ratio  1.10 1.14 1.13  1.10 1.10
Urban-rural wage ratio  1.80 1.75 1.75  1.80 1.80
Search (% of time, informal sector)  0.19 0.23 0.23  0.19 0.19
        
Agricultural labour (% of total)  0.28 0.34 0.34  0.37 0.37
Formal sector (% of total)  0.50 0.48 0.48  0.44 0.44
Informal sector (% of total)  0.22 0.18 0.18  0.19 0.19
        
Agricultural wages (% increase)    5.95 5.61  0.00 0.00
Formal sector wages (% increase)    3.23 2.51  0.00 0.00
Total labour income (% increase)    0.08 -0.24  -5.33 -5.33
        
Agricultural output (% increase)    29.10 29.35  33.56 33.56
Formal sector output (% increase)    -2.14 -1.86  -13.05 -13.05
Informal sector output (% increase)    -20.39 -22.35  -13.05 -13.05
        
GDP (% increase)    2.56 2.58  -4.16 -4.16
GNP (% increase)    2.56 2.58  1.76 1.76
    
  
Table 5. The effects of raising TFP in the formal sector by 20% 
 
 
    Closed capital account  Open capital account 
  Baseline New (NB) New (EW)  New (NB) New (EW)
       
Urban unemployment rate  0.30 0.24 0.22  0.12 0.08
Vacancy rate  0.08 0.10 0.12  0.16 0.25
Matching rate  0.04 0.05 0.05  0.05 0.06
        
Formal-informal wage ratio  1.10 1.20 1.18  1.76 1.71
Urban-rural wage ratio  1.80 1.68 1.66  1.31 1.25
Search (% of time, informal sector)  0.19 0.30 0.29  0.93 0.95
        
Agricultural labour (% of total)  0.28 0.22 0.22  0.08 0.08
Formal sector (% of total)  0.50 0.60 0.61  0.81 0.85
Informal sector (% of total)  0.22 0.18 0.17  0.11 0.07
        
Agricultural wages (% increase)    17.35 16.34  120.24 123.51
Formal sector wages (% increase)    9.25 7.32  60.00 55.34
Total labour income (% increase)    13.93 13.11  82.95 84.68
        
Agricultural output (% increase)    -8.97 -8.50  -37.10 -37.65
Formal sector output (% increase)    28.99 29.88  149.08 159.83
Informal sector output (% increase)    -25.88 -30.48  -95.48 -97.73
        
GDP (% increase)    18.01 18.13  98.54 104.10
GNP (% increase)    18.01 18.13  30.88 31.55
         
Table 6. The effects of raising the matching efficiency index M by 20% 
 
 
    Closed capital account  Open capital account 
  Baseline New (NB) New (EW)  New (NB) New (EW)
       
Urban unemployment rate  0.30 0.26 0.29  0.24 0.26
Vacancy rate  0.08 0.07 0.06  0.08 0.05
Matching rate  0.04 0.04 0.04  0.05 0.04
        
Formal-informal wage ratio  1.10 1.08 1.11  1.11 1.13
Urban-rural wage ratio  1.80 1.76 1.79  1.72 1.74
Search (% of time, informal sector)  0.19 0.19 0.20  0.23 0.23
        
Agricultural labour (% of total)  0.28 0.28 0.27  0.26 0.25
Formal sector (% of total)  0.50 0.53 0.51  0.56 0.55
Informal sector (% of total)  0.22 0.19 0.21  0.18 0.20
        
Agricultural wages (% increase)    -0.17 1.25  5.58 6.57
Formal sector wages (% increase)    -2.20 0.56  0.83 2.94
Total labour income (% increase)    -0.20 1.05  4.58 5.44
        
Agricultural output (% increase)    0.10 -0.72  -3.14 -3.67
Formal sector output (% increase)    2.09 0.81  12.06 9.43
Informal sector output (% increase)    -11.99 -2.90  -20.91 -14.05
        
GDP (% increase)    0.87 0.73  7.05 6.16
GNP (% increase)    0.87 0.73  1.58 1.88
        
  
Table 7. The effects of halving the lump-sum firing cost, initially twice the 
monthly wage in formal sector 
 
 
    Closed capital account  Open capital account 
  Baseline New (NB) New (EW)  New (NB) New (EW)
       
Urban unemployment rate  0.30 0.28 0.28  0.26 0.25
Vacancy rate  0.08 0.09 0.09  0.09 0.10
Matching rate  0.04 0.04 0.04  0.04 0.04
        
Formal-informal wage ratio  1.10 1.12 1.12  1.15 1.14
Urban-rural wage ratio  1.80 1.77 1.77  1.74 1.72
Search (% of time, informal sector)  0.19 0.21 0.21  0.24 0.25
        
Agricultural labour (% of total)  0.28 0.27 0.27  0.25 0.24
Formal sector (% of total)  0.50 0.53 0.53  0.55 0.57
Informal sector (% of total)  0.22 0.21 0.21  0.20 0.19
        
Agricultural wages (% increase)    3.40 3.18  8.25 8.92
Formal sector wages (% increase)    1.85 1.42  4.46 4.00
Total labour income (% increase)    2.85 2.66  6.81 7.33
        
Agricultural output (% increase)    -1.94 -1.82  -4.55 -4.90
Formal sector output (% increase)    1.80 1.98  9.91 12.42
Informal sector output (% increase)    -5.91 -7.17  -13.54 -18.43
        
GDP (% increase)    1.80 1.82  6.85 8.17
GNP (% increase)    1.80 1.82  2.35 2.53
        
  




    Closed capital account  Open capital account 
  Baseline New (NB) New (EW)  New (NB) New (EW)
       
Urban unemployment rate  0.30 0.34 0.35  0.39 0.43
Vacancy rate  0.08 0.09 0.09  0.08 0.07
Matching rate  0.04 0.05 0.05  0.04 0.04
        
Formal-informal wage ratio  1.10 1.08 1.08  1.03 1.04
Urban-rural wage ratio  1.80 1.78 1.78  1.85 1.88
Search (% of time, informal sector)  0.19 0.19 0.19  0.14 0.13
        
Agricultural labour (% of total)  0.28 0.28 0.28  0.32 0.33
Formal sector (% of total)  0.50 0.47 0.47  0.41 0.39
Informal sector (% of total)  0.22 0.25 0.25  0.27 0.29
        
Agricultural wages (% increase)    -0.94 -0.87  -8.51 -9.56
Formal sector wages (% increase)    -1.93 -1.79  -6.19 -5.54
Total labour income (% increase)    -0.82 -0.76  -7.52 -8.48
        
Agricultural output (% increase)    0.55 0.51  5.36 6.08
Formal sector output (% increase)    -2.98 -3.03  -18.64 -23.45
Informal sector output (% increase)    15.05 15.44  31.82 41.85
        
GDP (% increase)    -1.64 -1.64  -11.02 -13.52
GNP (% increase)    -1.64 -1.64  -2.56 -2.88





Technical appendix on the calibration (not for publication) 
 
Parameter assumptions (details) 
 
1. Technology parameters 
 
The figure for the labour exponent in the agricultural production function we take as 
37%, based on Imam and Whalley (1985), which in turn is based on Kehoe and Serra-
Puche (1983). This figure corresponds quite well to those in Taylor (2002). He reports 
labour shares of 40% for basic grains, 35% for modern grains, 60% for labour-intensive 
cash crops, 32% for capital-intensive cash crops, and 10% for livestock rearing. Without 
detailed information on the respective importance of these crops, we regard 37% as a 
representative figure. 
 
The figure for the labour exponent in the formal sector production function we set at 
43%, again following Imam and Whalley (1985). UNIDO data on the labour share for 
manufacturing suggest a lower value, 22% for 1991, but we choose a higher figure on 
the basis that the non-agricultural sector includes services (with a high labour share) as 
well as manufacturing. Note that otherwise, if we took the UNIDO share at face value 
and combined it with our choice of the labour share for agriculture, this would imply a 
very low aggregate labour share (labour income as a fraction of GDP). 
 
The Kehoe-Serra-Puche figures are a useful starting point but should not be taken too 
literally. First, they are based on relatively old data, requiring strong assumptions about 
parameter constancy over time. Second, they are not obtained by direct measurement, 
but by requiring that the observed sectoral structure is consistent with the equilibrium 
of a CGE model for Mexico. Nevertheless, given that these estimates have been used in 
several previous calibrations of dual economy models for Mexico (Imam and Whalley 
1985, Bhatia 2002) they form a natural starting point for our own analysis, and are less 
arbitrary than other potential choices. 
 
2. Agricultural employment share 
 
The agricultural employment share “La” is set to be 28%, based on ILO data for 1990 
extracted from the LABORSTA database. The exact figure is obtained as the 
economically active population in agriculture divided by the economically active 
population in agriculture, industry and services (both sexes). Our calculation assumes 
that informal sector workers are classed as economically active in industry and services; 
were this not the case, and hence informal sector workers were omitted from the 
denominator, the calculated employment share would have to be adjusted downwards 
to correspond to the variable “La” in the model. For example, with an informal sector 
employment share (“u”) of 30%, the value of “La” would be 21% rather than 28%. 
 
3. Informal sector as a share of urban workforce 
 
We require the baseline equilibrium of the model to match the informal sector's share of 
the urban workforce (“u”) as 30%, based on the estimate of Gong and van Soest (2002, p. 
519).  
 
4. Interest rate  
 
We set the annual interest rate at 4%, a figure often used in calibrations of 
macroeconomic models for developed countries (for example, Andolfatto 1996). 
 
5. Matching function elasticity 
 
We set this elasticity to 0.5, a standard choice in the literature on search and matching 
for developed countries. 
 
6. Monthly job separation rate 
 
The monthly job expiry rate λ is set at 6%. This is based on a quarterly figure reported 
by Gong and van Soest (2002), and assuming that the probability of job loss and re-
employment within a quarter is at its steady-state value. Note that given “u” this pins 
down steady-state matches m=λ(1-u) as a fraction of the urban workforce. 
 
7. Monthly vacancy fill rate 
 
In calibrating the vacancy fill rate, the inverse of the duration of vacancies, we have 
little information for developing countries, given data limitations and our relatively 
broad interpretation of what is meant by a "vacancy". Here we follow Andolfatto (1996) 
and Merz (1995) in imposing an average duration of 45 days. Assuming that a vacancy 
may be filled on each day of a 30-day month, this implies that in monthly terms the 
ratio m/v – the rate at which vacancies are filled – is equal to 1-(44/45)^30 or 
approximately 0.50. Since “m” is known (see section 6 above) this pins down the 
vacancy rate v and, given knowledge of m, s and u, this means that we can also pin 
down the matching efficiency index M. 
 
The figure of 45 days comes from a study of the Dutch economy by van Ours and 
Ridder (1992). We are being conservative here: our broad interpretation of a vacancy 
would suggest longer durations are plausible, and we could then match the observed 
size of the informal sector while assuming smaller flow costs of posting a vacancy. 
 
8. Recruitment costs 
 
A key parameter is the flow cost of posting a vacancy, c. To select a value for this 
parameter, we follow the approach of Andolfatto (1996) and impose the ratio of 
recruiting costs to formal sector output in the baseline steady-state. It is important to 
emphasize that our calibration is quite sensitive to the choice of this ratio. As the size of 
recruiting costs is progressively reduced, we need workers to receive a larger allocation 
of the surplus (reducing returns to firms, and hence entry) if we are to continue 
matching an informal sector employment share of 30%. For our baseline calibration, we 
set the ratio at 3%, compared to Andolfatto's use of 1% for the US economy. This 
difference might be justified if the recruitment of formal sector workers is a costlier 
process in developing countries than in the US, for example, because systems for 
transmitting information about labour market opportunities are weaker. The paper 
briefly examines how our conclusions are modified by the alternative choice of 1%, used 
in Andolfatto (1996, p. 120). 
 
9. Firing costs and severance pay 
  
The model includes a role for firing costs, F. In the model these firing costs represent a 
resource cost to the firm of job expiry. We set these costs at twice the monthly wage at 
baseline, so that it will have a similar order of magnitude to severance pay. 
 
We set the severance pay parameter P to be four times the monthly wage. This is 
motivated by Mexico's labour market regulations: in essence, a firm that dismisses a 
worker must pay the worker three' months salary plus twenty days of salary for each 
year worked (for example, Capelleja 1997). 
 
Our estimate of the monthly job expiry rate implies an average job duration of almost 17 
months in the formal sector, so that setting P at four times the monthly wage is a 
reasonable approximation. In the calibration, given that severance payments are always 
proportional to salaries, the lump-sum P is adjusted so that it rises or falls in proportion 
to the formal sector wage when a new equilibrium is derived.    
 
10. Elasticity of search costs 
 
For the elasticity of search costs with respect to search intensity, see Yashiv (2000). 
Using microeconomic data, a quadratic function emerges as his preferred specification. 
As in our calibrated model, he assumes search costs are proportional to unemployment 
income - in our model, the informal sector wage. 
 
11. Wage differentials 
 
The ratio of the formal sector wage to the agricultural wage we set at 1.80. This figure is 
based on the ratio of manufacturing earnings per month to those in agriculture for men 
in 1991, using ILO LABORSTA data (originally from a labour force survey). This figure 
should be seen as an upper bound on the true differential, because manufacturing 
workers are likely to be more skilled on average than agricultural workers. For women 
the manufacturing earnings per month are slightly below those in agriculture but this 
appears to be due to differences in working hours. When figures on earnings per hour 
become available, in 1998, the ratio of the manufacturing wage to the agricultural wage 
is around 2.00 for men and women combined, and around 1.50 for women. Venables 
and van Wijnbergen (1993) assumed that the urban marginal product for unskilled 
labour in Mexico was twice that in rural areas. 
 
The ratio of the formal sector wage to the informal sector wage is harder to calibrate, 
given our assumption that workers are homogenous. This is because Gong and van 
Soest (2002) find that their estimated wage differentials, corrected for selection effects, 
differ across subgroups of the population. For men and women with low or 
intermediate education, there is no formal sector wage premium, or even a small 
premium for the informal sector (their Table 5). For the highly educated, who comprise 
19% of the men and 7% of the women in their sample, there is a substantial formal 
sector premium of around 45%, correcting for selection effects. Given the relatively 
small proportion of individuals who are highly educated, and the uncertainties inherent 
in estimating wage differentials, we set the formal-informal sector wage premium at a 




We reduce each model to 3 nonlinear simultaneous equations and then solve them 
numerically to obtain unconstrained parameters and outcomes at the baseline 
equilibrium. We then use a similar procedure to solve for the new equilibrium in 
response to a parameter change. At each stage we check that the key equations for the 
steady-state of the model are satisfied by the derived equilibrium. 
 
More details can be made available on request. 
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